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Forward
Karen Young
Karen Young is Senior Resident Fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. She 
is also Visiting Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre, where she acts as Project Consultant on 
a collaborative research project between LSE, Qatar University and the American University of 
Sharjah, analysing the foreign policies of GCC states. 
As part of our Emirates Academic Collaboration with Arab Universities grant, we met 
in January 2015 in Doha for our second workshop on ‘Mapping GCC Foreign Policy: 
Resources, Recipients and Regional Effects’, to analyse the increasingly intervention-
ist Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ foreign policy. Our debate was lively and 
sustained by leading political scientists of the Arab Gulf states. The following are three 
papers presented at the workshop; the first addresses the impact of the Syrian war on 
Turkey’s Kurdish conflict, while the other two tackle Qatar’s foreign policy. 
Some of the workshop participants were skeptical of a paper focusing on the domes-
tic politics, particularly Kurdish politics, of Turkey. For many analysts of the Arab 
Gulf states, politics of the Gulf stop at the water’s edge. However, what others have 
tried to stress is the increasing widening sphere of influence of GCC states’ policies 
and interests in the Middle East and North Africa. What we are also witnessing is 
the spread of violence and conflict, certainly not always originating in the GCC, but 
with implications for GCC states and the larger citizen and resident populations they 
host. Turkey’s long-standing conflict with its Kurdish population hence represents a 
Gulf state’s primary fear, a well-organised (and armed) minority group with a political 
agenda and organising force outside of state borders. The future of the Kurdish move-
ment, as a political and military force, will impact the ability of the Arab Gulf states to 
intervene in their widening sphere of influence. Evren Balta’s work represents the best 
of comparative case analysis focused on understanding the domestic context of the 
politics of minority populations and separatist movements that spread over existing 
state boundaries. In a MENA region with competing centers of power and influence, 
these domestic spillovers will allow us to anticipate regional changes and alliances. 
The foreign policy of Qatar has been a moving target over the last decade, though 
few analysts have been able to attribute exactly how domestic and international factors 
have had a causal effect. In his paper, Jamal Abdullah focuses on the domestic politics 
within Qatar and its leadership transition, giving specific attention to Qatar’s role as 
regional mediator. The paper by Evren Tok, Jason McSparren and Fatima Ramadan 
Sanz puts Qatari foreign investment in comparative perspective and asks what strategic 
goals Qatar seeks to achieve with its widening foreign economic policy. Both of these 
papers are seeking to unlock the so-called ‘black boxes’ of Arab Gulf states’ foreign 
policies. The lead authors are based in Qatar and are well-positioned to examine the 
evolving foreign policy of this small, yet powerful, member of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council. Our ability to analyse patterns of Gulf state policy formulation and execution 
will help advance a framework of foreign policy analysis in the region. 
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The Syrian War and Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict
Evren Balta
Abstract
Turkey has played a key role in Syria’s multi-sided conflict. In a conflict not of its own 
making, Turkey soon became a hub and transit point for refugees, insurgent fighters 
and foreign aid. As refugees, fighters, money and munitions moved from one side of 
the border to the other, the Syrian conflict became not only internationalised but also 
an intrinsic part of Turkey’s domestic politics. In the context of the Syrian conflict, 
the alliance structures of Turkey have shifted, and contradictory foreign and domestic 
policies have emerged, puzzling many observers on the country’s position. This paper 
argues that Turkey’s policy in Syria cannot be understood without thoroughly analys-
ing the linkages between domestic conflicts, transnational ties and regional ambitions. 
Although Turkey has shown many elements of sectarian interventionism in the context 
of Syria, it was not ‘sectarianism’ per se but mainly these linkages that shaped its policy 
towards Syria. By focusing on Turkey’s Kurds in the context of the Syrian conflict, this 
paper analyses how domestic politics were shaped and reshaped by larger regional and 
international opportunity structures. 
About the Author
Evren Balta teaches at Yıldız Technical University, Department of Political Science 
and International Relations. She completed her PhD in the Department of Political 
Science at CUNY-Graduate Center, New York with a dissertation entitled ‘Military 
Success, State Capacity and Internal Conflict in Russia and Turkey’. She holds Master’s 
degrees from Middle East Technical University, Department of Sociology (1995–8) 
and Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs (1999–2000). 
Teaching primarily in the areas of comparative politics, she has special research inter-
ests in conflict/war studies, civil–military relations and citizenship. In addition to being 
the author of several book chapters and articles, she is the co-editor (with İsmet Akça) 
of Politics of Military, State, and Security in Turkey (İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2010), 
author of Global Security Complex (İletisim Press, 2012) and editor of Introduction to 
Global Politics: Concepts, Theories and Processes (İletisim Press, 2014). 
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Introduction
Since the Syrian crisis began in 2011, it has been estimated that Turkey has hosted 
over one and a half million Syrian refugees, most of whom have fled conflict in the 
Syrian provinces bordering the country.1 As the plight of the refugees continues to 
worsen, Turkey’s refugee policy has become a major source of domestic tension.2 In 
several border provinces, Syrians have begun to outnumber the local population, esca-
lating the local conflicts between Turkish citizens and Syrian refugees over jobs, rents 
and security.3 The lack of transparency and the sectarian refugee admission policy 
have become issues of domestic tension and criticism.4 
If the influx of Syrian refugees is one area in which the Syrian conflict has influenced 
Turkish domestic politics, another is the issue of foreign fighters and Syrian jihadists 
using Turkey as a transit country.5 The government has been accused of turning a 
blind eye to the entry of thousands of foreigners who cross the border, and of har-
bouring Syrian jihadist fighters, thus promoting a sectarian agenda and potentially 
increasing the possibility of sectarian conflict in Turkey.6 
Criticism of the government is also related to the influx of ‘foreign aid’ and its dis-
tribution.7 Since the start of the Syrian conflict, Turkey has been the main transit 
route for humanitarian aid to civilians and for military and financial aid to the Syrian 
opposition. It has been claimed that this ‘undocumented’ aid was being provided by 
Gulf actors, with Turkey playing the role of intermediary for the financial and military 
1  UNHCR, ‘2015 Country Operations Profile: Turkey’. Available at http://www.unhcr.org/pag-
es/49e48e0fa7f.html (accessed 10 March 2015).
2  Turkey passed its first asylum legislation as a response to the escalating Syrian crisis in April 2013. 
The law came into effect on 11 April 2014. However, non-European foreigners can still not receive 
‘refugee’ status, because the law did not lift the geographical limitation that Turkey maintains on 
the 1951 Geneva refugee convention and 1967 protocol. Thus, Syrian refugees are still ‘guests’ who 
are under ‘temporary protection’. Crisis Group Europe Report, ‘The Rising Costs of Turkey’s Syrian 
Quagmire N. 230’, 30 April 2014. Available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/tur-
key-cyprus/turkey/230-the-rising-costs-of-turkey-s-syrian-quagmire.pdf (accessed 15 February 2015).
3  ‘The Vortex’, New Yorker, 8 December 2014. Available at http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2014/12/08/vortex (accessed 15 March 2015).
4  ‘Syrian Conflict Brings Sectarian Tensions to Turkey’s Tolerant Hatay Province’, The Guardian, 
3 September 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/03/syria-crisis-threat-
ens-turkish-tolerance (accessed 5 March 2015).
5  ‘A Path to ISIS, through a Porous Turkish Border’, New York Times, 9 March 2015. Available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/world/europe/despite-crackdown-path-to-join-isis-often-winds-
through-porous-turkish-border.html?_r=0 (accessed 15 March 2015).
6  ‘Pressure Mounts on Turkey over Radical Groups in Syria’, Al-Monitor, 15 October 2013. Available at 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/turkey-must-control-jihadists-entering-syria.html 
(accessed 10 March 2015).
7  ‘Turkey and Saudi Arabia Alarm the West by Backing Islamist Extremists the Americans Had 
Bombed in Syria’, Independent, 12 May 2015. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
middle-east/syria-crisis-turkey-and-saudi-arabia-shock-western-countries-by-supporting-antiassad-ji-
hadists-10242747.html (accessed 15 June 2015).
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interventionism of the Arab Gulf States.8 The government was accused of establishing 
sectarian links with the ‘Sunni bloc’ represented mainly by the Gulf countries. 
In fact, in the context of the Syrian conflict, the concept of ‘sectarian war’ has become 
a very popular analytical tool. Studies utilising the concept of sectarianism, however, 
generally lack a solid theoretical base and are unclear about how ‘sectarianism’ relates 
to broader models of foreign policy making. It has been almost automatically assumed 
that the foreign policies of regional actors involved are shaped by ideological or polit-
ical commitments which correspond to identity blocs, rather than to changing political 
opportunity structures and interests. The conflict in Syria is then represented as a 
conflict that adopts a sectarian frame – that is, Sunni Salafis on one side and Irani-
an-backed, ideologically influenced Shi’a Islamists on the other9 – with sectarianism 
understood as an immutable feature of the region. 
In more nuanced views of the Syrian conflict as a ‘sectarian war’, sectarianism is 
understood as a strategic tool utilised by the elites to promote their own interests. For 
example, Matthiesen explains the rise of sectarianism in the Middle East ‘as a result 
of an amalgam of political, religious, social, and economic elites who use sectarian-
ism to further their personal aims’.10 According to him, this constitutes a new type of 
sectarianism, and it works through sectarian entrepreneurs who strengthen divisions 
between Sunni and Shi’a strategically in order to prevent a cross-sectarian opposition 
front.11 Wehrey has similarly discussed sectarianism as a tool utilised by governments 
and oppositions in order to enhance their credentials vis-à-vis their respective domes-
tic constituencies as well as among regional and global powers.12 According to Wehrey, 
sectarianism ‘arises from a combination of exclusionary policies at home and regional 
shocks abroad’.13 For Gause, sectarianism is instrumental in building alliances between 
regional and local actors.14 Providing clients with material support is important, but 
without ideological or identity links it does not suffice to sustain influence. 
In the context of Turkish foreign policy in Syria, as outlined briefly above, the con-
cept of sectarianism has been widely used, and Turkish foreign policy has simply 
been understood as the outcome of an ideological commitment to the ‘Sunni bloc’.15 
Although Turkey has shown many elements of sectarian interventionism in the con-
text of Syria, its policy cannot be understood simply as such a commitment. Right 
8  ‘Tır’daki sır aydınlandı’, Cumhuriyet, 13 February 2015. Available at http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/
haber/turkiye/213863/_TIR_daki_sir_aydinlandi.html (accessed 15 March 2015).
9  Aaron Zelin and Phillip Smyth, ‘The Vocabulary of Sectarianism’, Washington Institute for Near East-
ern Policy, 29 January 2014.
10  Toby Matthiesen, Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring That Wasn’t (Palo Alto, 
2013), p. ix.
11  Ibid.
12  Frederic Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York, 2014).
13  Ibid., p. 219.
14  F. Gregory Gause III, Beyond Sectarianism: The New Middle East Cold War, Analysis Paper 11, Brook-
ings Doha Center (Doha, 2014). 
15  For such a perspective, see Halil Karaveli, ‘Turkey is No Partner for Peace: How Ankara’s Sectar-
ianism Hobbles US Syria Policy’, Foreign Affairs, 11 September 2012.
The Syrian War and Turkey’s Kurdish Conflict 9 
from the beginning, Turkish foreign policy in Syria was dominated by how Turkish 
policy-makers perceived their strategic interests given domestic, regional and interna-
tional opportunity structures. It was used to foster the strategic interests of the elites, 
to build alliances with powerful Gulf actors, and to sustain influence over the Syrian 
opposition. Domestically, the language of ‘sectarianism’ is a ‘bellwether for the deeply 
entrenched problems of governance’.16
Among these strategic interests and problems of governance, the Kurdish conflict 
stands out. Especially since the Syrian conflict began, it has become almost impossi-
ble to differentiate Turkey’s (already regional) Kurdish conflict from regional power 
struggles. What was previously a mainly domestic problem turned regional, and the 
Turkish government began to look for allies to consolidate its own political position, 
frequently employing sectarian language and using sectarian links to level the Kurdish 
opposition in both Syria and Turkey. 
The Syrian Crisis, Turkey and the Kurds
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Syrian government provided strategic support 
to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistani, PKK), the guerrilla 
organisation waging war against the Turkish military in Turkey’s Kurdish regions. 
Syria allowed PKK training camps on its territory, let PKK forces enter Turkey, and 
granted refuge to PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in Damascus.17 The support that the 
Syrian government provided to the PKK was related to the perception that Turkey was 
sheltering the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the major opposition force to the Syrian 
government. Syria’s support was also used as leverage in the ongoing water disputes 
between the two governments.18 Supporting the PKK was perceived too by the Syrian 
government as a way to quell the possible aspirations of its own Kurdish population.19 
As a result, the Turkish government viewed its foreign relations with Syria mainly 
through the lens of this active support for the PKK, especially in the 1990s when the 
conflict in southeast Turkey was very intense.
In 1998, the tension between Syria and Turkey over the Kurdish issue transformed 
into a major crisis, described by Olson as almost an ‘undeclared war’.20 Unwilling to 
go to war, the government of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad complied with Ankara’s 
demands, ending the crisis with the signing of the Adana Agreement on 20 October. 
16  Wehrey, Sectarian Politics, p. 219.
17  Robert Olson, ‘Turkish and Syrian Relations Since the Gulf War: The Kurdish Question and the 
Water Problem’, in Ferhad Ibrahim and Gülistan Gürbey (eds), The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles 
and Chances for Peace and Democracy (New York, 2000). Robert Olson, Turkey’s Relations with Iran, Syria, 
Israel, and Russia, 1991–2000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions (Costa Mesa, 2001).
18  Ali Carkoğlu and Mine Eder, ‘Domestic Concerns and the Water Conflict over the Euphrates–
Tigris River Basin’, Middle Eastern Studies 37/1 (2001), pp. 41–71.
19  Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür, ‘From Distant Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian–
Turkish Relations’, Security Dialogue 37/2 (2006), pp. 229–48 at pp. 232–3.
20   Olson, Turkey’s Relations.
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This agreement explicitly ended Syrian support for the PKK,21 as the Syrian govern-
ment acknowledged that the PKK was a terrorist organisation.22 Abdullah Öcalan was 
then immediately expelled from Syria, and was captured the following year by the 
Turkish government. Right after his capture, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire, 
and some of its remaining 3,000–5,000 militants moved into Iraqi Kurdistan.23 
It was then that the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) 
won the general election in Turkey on 3 November 2002, with 34 per cent of the votes 
thus gaining 65 per cent of the parliamentary seats. With this victory, the AKP became 
the first party since 1991 to govern without coalition partners. The improvement in 
Turkey’s relations with the West during this period and the rapprochement with the 
EU created a positive environment for solving the Kurdish problem.24 The normali-
sation of the Kurdish issue further advanced when the AKP pushed through reforms 
that significantly reduced the role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in domestic 
politics and approved (albeit very limited) cultural, educational and linguistic rights 
for the Kurds.25 Throughout the 2000s, the AKP never entirely forwent the political 
option for the resolution of its domestic Kurdish problem, and initiated several peace/
solution processes.26
The relations between Syria and Turkey greatly benefited from the normalisation of 
the Kurdish issue. The AKP government thought that a constructive Syrian policy 
would help not only consolidate its Kurdish problem domestically, but also increase 
Turkey’s regional influence through trade. This was also in line with the government’s 
‘zero-problem’ approach to its neighbours and its wish to tone down its conflicts with 
them, while negotiating proactively and looking pragmatically for opportunities to 
solve conflicts and create cooperation.27 At that point, analysts perceived Turkey’s 
active foreign policy in the Middle East very positively. 
In 2004, a bilateral free-trade agreement was signed between Syria and Turkey, open-
ing Syria’s economy to Turkish businesses. A mutual agreement on water resources was 
reached in 2008; water had previously constituted a major source of conflict between 
the two countries. Syria’s exports to Turkey more than tripled from $187 million in 
2006 to $662 million in 2010, while Turkish exports to Syria grew from $609 million to 
21  Caroline James and Özgür Özdamar, ‘Modeling Foreign Policy and Ethnic Conflict: Turkey’s 
Policies Towards Syria’, Foreign Policy Analysis 5/1 (2009), pp. 17–36.
22   M. B. Aykan, ‘The Turkish–Syrian Crisis of October 1998: A Turkish View’, Middle East Policy 6/4 
(1999), pp. 174–91. 
23   Evren Balta Paker, ‘The Ceasefire This Time’, MERIP Online, 31 August 2005. Available at http://
www.merip.org/mero/mero083105.html (accessed 5 February 2015).
24   Kemal Kirişçi, ‘The Kurdish Question and Turkish Foreign Policy’, in Dimitris Keridis and Lenore 
Martin (eds), The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA, 2004), pp. 277–314.
25   Balta Paker, ‘The Ceasefire This Time’.
26  Marlies Casier, Joost Jongerden and Nic Walker, ‘Turkey’s Kurdish Movement and the AKP’s 
Kurdish Opening: Kurdish Spring or Fall?’, in Mohammed Ahmed and Michael Gunter (eds),The 
Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds, vol. 12 (Costa Mesa, 2013), pp. 135–62.
27   Bulent Aras, ‘Turkey and the GCC: An Emerging Relationship’, Middle East Policy 12/4 (2005), pp. 
89–97 at p. 90.
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$1.85 billion in the same period.28 An enhanced diplomatic and cultural relationship 
followed. In July 2009, the two countries signed the Strategic Cooperation Agreement, 
which was intended as a collaboration against terrorism. In the same year, Turkey 
lifted visa restrictions for Syrian citizens: by the end of 2010, some 60,000 Syrians were 
visiting Turkey every month.29 
As Altuğ has observed, this was also a time of rising anti-Kurdish sentiment within 
Syria.30 In 2003, the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, PYD) was 
established in the Kurdish-dominated regions of Syria by Kurdish activists with close 
affiliations to Turkey’s PKK. In fact, Syrian support for the PKK in the 1990s enabled 
the party to gain a foothold among Syrian Kurds that proved difficult to reverse even 
after the Syrian government withdrew its support. This would eventually create the 
unintended consequence of the Syrian Kurdish opposition creating strong links with 
that of Turkey. Thus, the Turkish and Syrian governments had a joint interest in col-
laborating against the Kurdish opposition. 
In fact, coupled with the US invasion of Iraq and the establishment of the Kurdistan 
Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq,31 the Kurdish question was increas-
ingly perceived by the Turkish government as a regional issue that should be dealt 
with through regional strategies and alliances. Thus, the Turkish government bene-
fited enormously from the increasingly repressive stance of the Assad regime against 
the Kurdish opposition. Given the economic collaboration and joint security interests, 
when the rebellion began in Syria in March 2011, the Turkish government believed 
that the destabilisation of Syria was not in Turkey’s national interest, especially if that 
would eventually mean territorial breakdown. The possibility of an independent Kurd-
istan in Syria was perceived as a major national security threat, given that Syrian Kurds 
have strong links with Turkey’s Kurds.32 
28  Christopher Phillips, Into the Quagmire: Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy, Chatham House Briefing 
Paper (London, 2012), p. 3.
29  André Bank and Roy Karadağ. ‘The “Ankara Moment”: The Politics of Turkey’s Regional Power 
in the Middle East, 2007–11’, Third World Quarterly 34/2 (2013), pp. 287–304 at p. 296.
30  Seda Altuğ, ‘The Syrian Uprising and Turkey’s Ordeal with the Kurds’, Dialectical Anthropology 37/1 
(2013), pp. 123–30.
31  Although the Turkish government also initially resisted the establishment of the KRG, through the 
massive influx of Turkish investment northern Iraq soon became Turkey’s second-largest market for 
exports (Henri J. Barkey, ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’. Adelphi Papers 54/447–8 (2014), pp. 99–122 at 
p. 106). Flourishing trade between the two helped overcome decades of tension, making the KRG a 
major ally of the Turkish government in the region. This was also related to the fact that the Turkish 
government realised that it could use the KRG’s influence in the region to counter that of the PKK. 
32  On 27 July 2015 Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the number one priority of 
Turkish national security was to prevent the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in the 
south of Turkey. ‘Bir Devlet Kurulmasına Asla Müsade Etmeyeceğiz’, Sabah, 27 June 2015. Avail-
able at http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2015/06/27/guneyimizde-yeni-bir-devlete-izin-vermeyiz 
(accessed 30 June 2015).
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The Syrian Conflict Goes Regional: Turkey Among its Allies 
When the Syrian uprising began, the Turkish government quickly called for social, 
economic and political reforms even offering help to achieve the required changes.33 
Nevertheless, the Turkish government’s pro-Assad stance angered not only protestors 
in Syria, but also Turkey’s Arab allies, especially the Gulf bloc. Besides, Syrian presi-
dent Bashar al-Assad was not eager to negotiate with the protestors, or to initiate any 
kind of reform. More importantly, however, as the protests intensified and as the other 
regional powers, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, began to pour aid towards the 
Syrian opposition, the Turkish government started to believe that the Assad regime 
would not last long.34 The Turkish government assumed that, in order to be an active 
agent in the construction of a post-Assad political order in line with its own domes-
tic and regional priorities, especially with regard to the management of the Kurdish 
issue, it should change, and it thus began supporting the Syrian opposition.35 In the 
last months of 2011 the AKP government started criticising the Assad regime as inhu-
mane, and by the beginning of 2012 was insistently calling for regime change. 
However, the policy in Syria was thus rife with conflict and indeterminate alliance 
patterns for Turkey right from the beginning. For one, Iran and Russia were backing 
Assad’s forces and Turkey had been in the process of developing closer connections 
with both states diplomatically and economically. Furthermore, both states strongly 
supported a unified Syria, which coincided with the ‘territorial integrity’ policy objec-
tive of Turkey. Turkey has also been in close security cooperation with Iran against 
the PKK and the Party of Free Life in Kurdistan (Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê, 
PJAK),36 being involved in joint military operations against the rebel group since 2003. 
Although the Syrian issue created major tensions between Turkey and Iran, the AKP 
government declared several times that their differences over the Assad regime would 
33  Ömer Taşpınar, ‘Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria’, Washington Quarterly 35/3 (2012), pp. 127–40 
at p. 137.
34  ‘Davutoğlu, Esad’a Ömür Biçti’, Hürriyet, 25 August 2012. Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
planet/21300142.asp (accessed 5 March 2015).
35  Altuğ, ‘Syrian Uprising’.
36  The PJAK is a Kurdish political/militant organisation in Iran, which has waged an armed struggle 
against the Iranian government since 2003 for the cultural and political rights of Kurds. Kurdish 
movements both in Syria (PYD) and in Iran (PJAK) have close connections with Turkey’s PKK. As van 
Bruinessen has argued, all Kurdish political movements of the twentieth century have concentrated 
their efforts on only one part of Kurdistan (Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Transnational Aspects of the 
Kurdish Question’. Working Paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European Uni-
versity Institute (Florence, 2000)). The partial exception to this was the PKK. Starting in the 1980s, 
the PKK has been the sole Kurdish political actor in Turkish politics. It is the inspirer, organiser and 
protector of the PYD in Syria and the PJAK in Iran. Although both the PYD and the PJAK are directly 
linked to the internal dynamics of Syrian and Iranian Kurdish society, respectively, they are often 
regarded as the PKK’s local branches.
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not jeopardize their relations;37 in fact, the AKP government was even open to the 
possibility of an Iranian role in a post-Assad Syria. On the other hand, Turkey openly 
sided with the Gulf States, which were aligned against the Iran–Russia–Syria alliance. 
These multiple alliance structures, and especially Turkey’s good relations with Iran, 
suggest that its foreign policy was not following a strict sectarian line. Indeed, then 
foreign minister (soon to be prime minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu’s long-standing foreign 
policy perspective in the Middle East was based not on a sectarian stance, but on a bal-
ance-of-power analysis. According to Davutoğlu, the most disastrous development for 
Turkey’s foreign policy would come from pan-Arab nationalism. A Middle East, he has 
argued, with such an increasing nationalism would prevent Turkey from becoming a 
regional player and make the country dependent on major global powers.38 Therefore, 
as Davutoğlu has stated, ‘Turkey’s priority foreign policy objective in the Middle East is 
to prevent Arab states from uniting around a national identity against Turkey.’39 ‘The 
most important tool to achieve this objective is to have individual relations with each 
Arab nation, leveling them against each another’,40 and to establish good relations 
with Iran. Davutoğlu also openly acknowledged that the failure to develop a flexible 
balancing policy which rests on these two pillars – that is, good relations with Iran and 
preventing the emergence of pan-Arabism – would allow the PKK to gain a stronghold 
within the region, thus colliding with Turkey’s regional as well as domestic ambitions.41 
Therefore the fact that the Gulf states themselves were in different camps, supporting 
different factions of the opposition, was very advantageous for Turkey. Saudi Arabia 
was backing Salafi groups to counter the influence of Iran and Hezbollah, supporting 
the formation of the Islamic Front in 2013, but refusing to back Jabhat al-Nusra and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), all of which had ties to al-Qaeda.42 Qatar, 
on the other hand, was supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, to which the AKP had 
close historical and ideological ties.43 
Eager to become an influential player in the region, the AKP government began to 
back groups affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood over the Salafists among the Syrian 
opposition, thus aligning with Qatar. In fact, both Turkey and Qatar supported the 
Muslim Brotherhood, not only in Syria, but also in Egypt and Tunisia as a way to 
influence and (re)shape the Middle East. This alliance paid off in the beginning. For 
example, when the Syrian National Council (SNC) was established in August 2011, 
37  Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu, during a visit to Iran with prime minister Erdoğan in March 
2012, said: ‘There is common ground between Turkey and Iran. We will not allow a regional balance 
based on Turkish–Iranian rivalry to emerge. There could be those who want a new cold war, but both 
Turkey and Iran know history well enough not to let this happen’ (cited in Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The 
Arab Spring: Its Geostrategic Significance’. Middle East Policy 19/3 (2012), pp. 84–97).
38  Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (İstanbul, 2011), p. 415.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid., p. 416.
41  Ibid., p. 141.
42  Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, p. 7.
43  Crystal Ennis and Bessma Momani, ‘Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: 
Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies’, Third World Quarterly 34/6 (2013), pp. 1127–44 at p. 1140.
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the Qatar–Turkey axis exerted a disproportionate influence via the Muslim Brother-
hood, which controlled the largest number of council seats and the influential relief 
committee that distributed aid to the fighters.44 Nevertheless, the conflict between the 
Turkey/Qatar-backed Brotherhood and the Saudi-backed Salafists prevented not only 
the creation of a unified rebel force, but also the toppling of the Assad regime.45 Thus, 
although there seemed to be a unified regional bloc against Assad, every actor had its 
own agenda for a post-Assad Syria. This had a major impact on fracturing the Syrian 
opposition along different lines of interest.46 Regional (state and non-state) powers 
provided their clients on the ground with immense financial, military and diplomatic 
support, which consequently turned the conflict into one about access to resources 
and power, making the parties less likely to negotiate with each other, and prolonging 
the stalemate and hence the civil war.47 Mostly as a result of the fragmentation of the 
opposition forces and also due to military and economic aid from Iran and Russia, the 
Assad regime around 2013 was able to reclaim authority over most of the country’s 
urban ‘spine’, from Homs in the north to Damascus in the south.48 
This was a major blow to Turkey’s anti-Assad stance, since it made clear to Turkey 
that a postwar Syria would be partitioned along ethnic-religious lines, once again 
aggravating Turkey’s domestic fears regarding the Kurds. A second blow came from 
elsewhere. As mentioned above, Turkey’s stance in the anti-Assad camp was aligned 
with that of Qatar. Qatar and Turkey put a lot of emphasis on the role of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, both in the Syrian opposition and in a possible post-Assad Syria. How-
ever, the coup against the Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt on 3 July 2013 
radically altered its influence there as well as in Syria, possibly allowing Saudi Arabia 
to regain its footing.49 In an interview with Richard Falk, prime minister Davutoğlu 
clearly acknowledged this change of policy in Syria due to the coup in Egypt: 
There are three forces in the international community. First there are those 
that favor a democratic transition and support democratic groups: Turkey and 
several moderate democratic forces. Second are those political actors that are 
scared of democracy. These states prefer autocrats to govern their country: 
44  Steven Heydemann, ‘Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism’, Journal of Democracy 24/4 (2013), 
pp. 59–73 at p. 69.
45  Phillips, Into the Quagmire, p. 7.
46  It was not only states, but also wealthy oil-rich individuals from the Gulf region whom the Gulf States 
were either unwilling or unable to control, who poured aid into the hands of the Syrian opposition.
47  Phillips, Into the Quagmire, p. 7. All the groups involved also created a needs-based relationship 
with the local communities that were tremendously affected by the civil war. All of these groups 
competed with each other, and local communities took advantage of funding by Gulf States. ‘Jabhat 
al-Nusra, Ghassan Hitto Divide Syrian Opposition’, Al-Monitor, 20 March 2013. Available at http://
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/politics/2013/04/syria-jabhat-nusra-opposition-hitto.html (accessed 5 
January 2015).
48  Heydemann, ‘Syria and the Future’, p. 64. 
49  In March 2014, Saudi Arabia officially designated the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates, and ISIS as terrorist organisations. In the same month, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain 
increased pressure on Qatar to reduce its support for the Brotherhood by staging a coordinated 
withdrawal of their ambassadors from Doha (Gause, Beyond Sectarianism, p. 17).
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Saudi Arabia, UAE, and the Gulf Countries, except for Qatar. The third group is 
countries that are sectarian, like Iran. Before, the first two were united against 
Iranian influence, so they worked together against Assad. However, after Sisi, 
that coalition has collapsed.50
But the real blow to Turkey’s Syrian policy, which involved controlling the Kurds while 
regaining its regional influence, would be the rise of ISIS. This put regional powers, 
such as Qatar and Turkey, which (allegedly) provided foreign aid to radical Islamic 
groups under the international spotlight, and under great pressure to cut ties with 
such groups.51 The rise of ISIS was also a major problem for the opposition, since it 
allowed Assad to legitimise himself by claiming that a post-Assad Syria would be a safe 
haven for radical Islamist groups. These (alleged) links also provoked much domestic 
criticism of the Turkish government. It was argued that this government (secretly) 
supported ISIS forces,52 in order to level the Kurdish opposition and to counter the 
emergence of an autonomous Kurdish region under the influence of the PYD. These 
criticisms reached their climax when major ISIS attacks were directed against Kurdish 
towns in Iraq and Syria. 
The Syrian Conflict Goes Domestic: Turkey Facing Kurds
Right after the uprising began, the Assad regime tried to re-establish its ties with 
minority groups, specifically the Kurds, in an attempt to leverage the strength of the 
uprising and to obstruct a total mobilisation of all sectors of Syrian society. As Altuğ 
has observed, the Assad regime immediately adopted more inclusive minority policies 
and rarely attacked minority-inhabited regions.53 This practice helped the regime in 
propagating the official discourse that the uprising was an armed Islamist one cre-
ated and supported by the US, Israel and Saudi against the Alawites. Reflecting this 
policy, one month after the first anti-Assad demonstrations in Syria, the regime issued 
a decree restoring the citizenship rights of Kurds who had been deprived of citizenship 
by the Ba’ath Party in 1963.54 Furthermore, the Assad forces withdrew from the Kurd-
ish enclaves in 2012, leaving control to local militias. The ‘opportunities’ presented by 
the civil war thus helped the PYD transform itself into a major regional actor. 
50 Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu in conversation with Richard Falk [emphasis 
mine]. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-richard-falk/turk-
ish-prime-minister-ahmet-davuto%C4%9Flu-in-conversation-part-1 (accessed 10 March 2015).
51  This sometimes leads to groups renaming themselves without changing anything else. See ‘Can 
al-Qaida’s Syrian Branch Rebrand?’, Slatest, 5 March 2015. Available at http://www.slate.com/blogs/
the_slatest/2015/03/05/can_al_qaida_s_syrian_branch_rebrand.html?wpsrc=fol_tw (accessed 15 
March 2015).
52  David Phillips, Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey List, 1 July 2015. Available at http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html (accessed 15 March 2015).
53  Altuğ, ‘Syrian Uprising’.
54  Ibid.
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As the PYD was becoming a major actor in Syria, the Turkish government continued 
to use every possible governance technique to level its influence. Turkey’s first tactic 
was to bolster the Sunni-dominated anti-Assad opposition, both for regional influence 
and against the Kurds. The second major tactic was to manipulate power struggles by 
exploiting political divisions among Kurds to level the influence of the PYD. Many 
Kurdish political organisations exist in the region. These organisations have complex 
and dynamic relations that includes antagonism, cooperation and in some cases direct 
links. These relations manifest themselves most acutely in Syria. 
A case in point, illustrating the Turkish government’s efforts to level the influence of 
the PYD, is the formation of the SNC. Initially the SNC did not incorporate signifi-
cant Kurdish groups into the Syrian opposition, mostly due to pressure from Turkey.55 
This not only bolstered the Arab nationalist attitude of the opposition, but also meant 
that the Kurdish struggle in Syria had become, in effect, separate from the anti-Assad 
opposition. Later on, the SNC was renamed as the National Coalition for Syrian Rev-
olutionary and Oppositional Forces, with the aim of making it demographically more 
inclusive (especially of Kurds).56 This time, however, the Turkish government insisted 
on incorporating non-PYD parties into the SNC, such as the Kurdish National Council 
(KNC),57 so as to undermine the PYD’s power and influence.58 
In spite of these efforts, Turkish fears about an autonomous Kurdish region were 
heightened when in November 2013 the PYD officially announced an interim gov-
ernment over three autonomous areas: Afrin, Jazira and Kobani. This move once 
again brought to the fore Turkish sensitivities about the possibility of another Kurd-
istan Region emerging.59 Turkey reacted to this development by erecting a wall along 
the border with Syria. The Turkish government even closed down the customs office 
of Nusaybin, cutting off contact with and unofficially imposing an embargo on the 
Kurds.60 These policies were interpreted by Turkey’s Kurdish political activists as the 
government’s declaration of war.
While Turkey was trying to cut links of its own Kurds with those of the rest of the 
region, it was also trying to contain its Kurdish question by negotiation. Fearful of a 
potential Kurdish state on its borders, the Turkish government was trying to control its 
55  Ibid.
56  ‘Deal with Kurds Gives Syrian Opposition a Boost’, National World, 18 September 2013. Available 
at http://www.thenational.ae/world/deal-with-kurds-gives-syrian-opposition-a-boost (accessed 5 Jan-
uary 2015).
57  KNC (in Arabic ENKS) was founded on 26 October 2011, under the sponsorship of KRG president 
Massoud Barzani. It is an umbrella organisation of Barzani-inspired political parties in Syria, and 
initially it was openly in conflict with the PYD. 
58  Altuğ, ‘Syrian Uprising’.
59 Gareth Stansfield, ‘The Unraveling of the Post-First World War State System? The Kurdistan 
Region of Iraq and the Transformation of the Middle East’, International Affairs 89/2 (2013), pp. 
259–82 at p. 279.
60  ‘Turkey’s New Border Wall Angers Kurds on Both Sides of Syrian Divide’, The Guardian, 8 
November 2013. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/08/turkey-new-border-
wall-kurds-syria (accessed 10 January 2015).
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Kurdish populations and the PKK. The PKK, on the other hand, was more concerned 
with stabilising its own force in Syria and backing Syrian Kurds than waging another 
costly war against the TAF. Thus, the AKP government launched negotiations with 
the PKK on the terms of ‘peace’ at the beginning of 2013. On 25 April 2013, the PKK 
announced that it would withdraw all its forces from within Turkey. 
However, this policy of balance and negotiation would come under direct attack, with 
the ISIS threat increasingly directed against Kurds in Iraq and Syria. In early October 
2014, ISIS fighters surrounded the eastern part of the Kurdish city of Kobani and 
began firing into it from higher ground. Turkish troops and tanks lined up on the 
Turkey–Syria border, as the Turkish government maintained its reluctance to give 
direct or indirect support to this small city. The Turkish government also refused to 
allow the Iraqi Peshmerga forces to cross through its territory to help the Syrian Kurds 
and denied Washington permission to conduct offensives out of the US Air Force base 
at İncirlik in Southern Turkey.61
On 6 and 7 October 2014, tens of thousands of Kurdish people in Turkey’s southeast 
took to the streets, protesting against the AKP’s Syrian policy, and asking the gov-
ernment to open its borders to refugees, and to allow Iraqi Peshmerga forces to cross 
into Syria to help the Syrian Kurds. Protests then spread across the country, including 
Ankara and Istanbul, leaving 42 people dead.62 The government imposed a curfew in 
six Kurdish-populated cities of Turkey in order to control the growing intensity of the 
protests.63 Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan warned that Kobani was ‘about 
to fall’.64 This statement was understood by the protesters not as a reality, but as the 
government’s preference.
The protests continued despite the emergency measures taken by the government. At 
the same time, as a result of growing internal pressures to take greater action against 
ISIS militants, Turkey allowed the Peshmerga forces to cross through its territory on 
22 October 2014. A small group of Syrian rebels also entered Kobani from Turkey 
to help Kurdish fighters battle against ISIS.65 Both developments were followed by 
the intensification of US-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS forces in Kobani. The 
city became the target of an average of half a dozen airstrikes every day, and more 
than 80 per cent of all coalition airstrikes in Syria were in or around it. US air forces 
even dropped weapons and medical supplies for Kurdish fighters, an event which was 
61  Barkey, ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’, p. 99.
62  ‘6-7 Ekim’in Acı Bilançosu’, Radikal, 12 November 2014. Available at http://www.radikal.com.tr/
turkiye/6_7_ekimin_aci_bilancosu_42_olu-1229423 (accessed 15 January 2015).
63  ‘Curfew in 6 Southeastern Cities’, Bianet English, 7 October 2014. Available at http://bianet.org/
english/world/158990-curfew-in-6-southeastern-cities (accessed 20 January 2015).
64  ‘Clashes Spread South and West of Kobani’, Al-Arabiya News, 7 October 2014. Available at http://
english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/10/07/Clashes-spread-south-and-west-of-Kobani.
html (accessed 12 January 2015).
65  ‘Turkey to Allow Kurdish Peshmerga across its Territory to Fight in Kobani’, The Guardian, 20 
October 2014. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/20/turkey-allows-peshmer-
ga-forces-to-travel-to-kobani (accessed 15 January 2015).
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acknowledged as a first in the Syrian conflict.66 On 26 January 2015, with the help of 
coalition forces, the Kurdish forces pushed ISIS out of Kobani. Thus Kobani, a city 
which was initially of little strategic value to the US-led coalition, became a model for 
defeating ISIS. This victory was crucial, because it was one of the first defeats of ISIS, 
which portrayed itself as invincible in order to attract not only local support, but also 
foreign jihadists.67 
The outcome of the Kobani battle, involving the PYD and the PKK in tandem with 
regular Peshmerga units, has dramatically altered the strategic image for the Kurds. 
Syrian and Turkish Kurds who came to fight were also joined by units from the Ira-
nian–Kurdish forces based in the area of the KRG, which had been inactive for most 
of the last decade.68 The large-scale atrocities that ISIS perpetrated against the local 
populations in Iraq and Syria forced a compromise solution between rival Kurdish par-
ties, pushing them to establish more cooperative links with each other hence creating 
a feeling of solidarity among ordinary Kurds.69 The Kobani victory was interpreted as 
a major defeat for Turkish policy in Syria.70
Conclusion
Turkish political elites pursued two critical foreign policy objectives in Syria which 
were initially believed to be complementary, and instrumentalised sectarian identities 
in order to achieve both of them. The first objective was to regain or retain regional 
influence in the emerging power struggle, by employing a flexible alliance strategy. The 
alliance strategy was also based on preventing a unified Arab bloc from forming in the 
Middle East. The second objective was to prevent the establishment of an autonomous 
Kurdish region in Syria, by supporting the anti-Assad opposition and various factions of 
Kurdish groups against the PYD. The Turkish government believed that the best polit-
ical project to achieve both objectives was to keep the territorial integrity of the Syrian 
state intact, together with regime change that would favour Turkey’s interests. 
 
However, what were initially thought to be complementary objectives soon became 
contradictory, and Turkey failed to achieve its objective in Syria: the installing of a 
friendly regime while keeping Syria’s territorial integrity intact. Inciting rivalries among 
the regional powers and bolstering sectarian identities helped fracture the Syrian 
66  ‘Islamic State Group Pushed Out of Syria’s Kobani’, Fox News, 26 January 2015. Available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2015/01/26/kurdish-officials-syrian-activists-islamic-state-group-mil-
itants-nearly-pushed/ (accessed 4 February 2015).
67 ‘In Liberated Kobani, Kurds Take Pride Despite the Devastation’, New York Times, 1 
February 2015. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/02/world/asia/in-liberated-koba-
ni-pride-despite-the-devastation.html?_r=1 (accessed 5 February 2015).
68  Barkey, ‘Turkey’s Syria Predicament’, p. 113.
69  Stansfield, ‘Unraveling’, p. 280.
70  Amberin Zaman, ‘Kurdish Victory in Kobani Defeat for Turkish Policy’, Al-Monitor, 28 January 
2015. Available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/01/turkey-kurds-kobani-de-
feat-turkish-policy.html# (accessed 5 February 2015).
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opposition, pushing it towards radicalisation. By 2015, it was clear that a postwar Syria 
would not keep its territory intact and that there would not be a regime change soon. 
Moreover, as the opposition has become more factionalised and sectarian, the political 
distance between the Kurdish and Arab oppositions has widened, making it impossible 
to build a unified alliance against the Assad regime. 
The Syrian conflict and the related regional processes also helped Kurdish politi-
cal actors overcome some of their differences and further fuelled the emergence of 
pan-Kurdish ideas and imaginings. It paved the way for an autonomous Kurdish region 
in Syria, which was in direct contrast to Turkey’s foreign policy objectives. Most impor-
tantly, the instrumentalisation of sectarian identities to achieve these two objectives 
helped to bolster sectarian politics in the region, which will have major consequences 
not only for Syria, but also for Turkish politics for years to come.
20 Mapping GCC Foreign Policy: Resources, Recipients and Regional Effects




Qatar’s foreign policy has undergone shifts in response to regional geopolitical devel-
opments. Though it was characterised by neutrality and mediation during the first 
decade of this millennium, it changed direction after the Arab Spring began, becom-
ing more interventionist by supporting Arab populations who were rebelling against 
authoritarian regimes and demanding greater freedom, dignity and the right to 
self-determination. With the ousting of President Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, escalating 
tensions and conflicts in Libya, the expansion of the Islamic State (IS) in the region, 
Houthi control of major state departments in Yemen and the recent Israeli offensive 
on the Gaza Strip, the geopolitical landscape and regional power balances have again 
shifted. These events have impacted Qatari foreign policy as it responds to ongoing 
developments at the regional and international levels. By reactivating its mediation 
role, utilising soft power tools and maintaining its commitments within international 
alliances to counter threats to its national and regional security, Qatar’s foreign policy 
has entered a new phase of wielding ‘smart power’. This paper analyses in detail the 
most prominent changes in Qatar’s foreign policy since Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad 
Al-Thani came to power on 25 June 2013.
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Introduction
Since Qatar’s independence in 1971, Qatari foreign policy has passed through various 
phases. There were two key turning points, the first being the transfer of power to 
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani in June 1995, and the second his abdication of 
power in favour of Crown Prince Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani in June 2013.
Like that of most other Gulf states, Qatar’s foreign policy was generally in agreement 
with the Saudi government’s foreign policy until the mid-1990s, when Doha carved 
an independent path after Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani came to power.1 
Adopting an ‘open’ foreign policy, which relied on soft power tools such as media, 
diplomacy, education, culture, sports, tourism, economics and humanitarian aid, 
Doha’s strategy was based on being a friendly neighbour and on the formation of 
strategic alliances with major and middle powers.2
Since the current ruler came to power, the Arab region has undergone several sub-
stantial changes that have reshaped the geopolitical landscape and regional power 
balances. The most significant of these are the ousting of former Egyptian presi-
dent Mohamed Morsi, escalating tensions and conflicts in Libya, the geographical 
and ideological expansion of the Islamic State (IS) in the region and the Houthi 
group’s control of major state departments in Yemen. Each of these events, among 
others, has undoubtedly impacted Doha’s foreign policy and how it responds to 
developments in the regional and international arenas. 
Fixed Principles of Qatar’s Foreign Policy
Qatar’s international relations doctrine focuses on the consolidation of peace and 
stability. Article 7 of the Qatari constitution states that the country’s foreign policy 
is ‘based on the principle of consolidating international peace and security3 and 
that its aims are: encouraging settlement of international disputes by peaceful 
means; supporting peoples’ rights to self-determination; non-interference in the 
internal affairs of other states and cooperation with peaceful nations.
Before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the former emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khal-
ifa Al-Thani, adopted diplomacy that focused on conflict resolution, which meant 
that Doha assumed the mediator role in almost every regional conflict, including 
those in Sudan, Eritrea, Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia and Yemen.
1  Jamal Abdullah, Qatar’s Foreign Policy 1995–2013: Leverages and Strategies (Doha: Al Jazeera Center 
for Studies, 2014).
2  Jamal Abdullah, ‘Qatari Position on the Arab Spring: Qatar’s Foreign Policy – From Neutrality to 
Influence’, in Mohammed Badri Eid and Jamal Abdullah (eds), The Gulf in a Changing Strategic Con-
text (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2014).
3  State of Qatar, ‘Permanent Constitution of the State of Qatar’, Article 7. Available at http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/
wcms_125870.pdf (accessed 1 July 2015).
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The positive results of this mediatory role secured recognition and credibility for 
Qatar at both the regional and international levels. Two examples are the May 
2008 Lebanon agreement and the 2007 release of the Bulgarian nurses and Pales-
tinian doctor detained in Libya. This determination to resolve disputes by peaceful 
means and to play the role of mediator is accompanied by Qatar’s willingness to 
accede to international arbitration over disagreements about its borders with its 
neighbours, as happened with Bahrain in the early 2000s.
While these are the general principles guiding Qatar’s foreign policy, since late 
2010, developments in both the regional and international arenas have shaped 
new principles that impacted the country’s foreign affairs.
From Neutrality to Influence
For fifteen years, Qatar’s foreign policy was distinguished by its neutrality and 
impartiality, until December 2010, when the outbreak of Arab Spring protests cat-
alysed a historic shift in the political landscape of the region. The Arab peoples 
who had been subjected to repression since their countries gained independence 
suddenly took to the streets to reclaim their freedom, dignity and right to self-de-
termination.
The revolution that started in Tunisia was perceived as a threat by several dic-
tatorships in the Arab world, while Qatar’s national leadership responded by 
supporting Arab nations’ choices, again based on Article 7 of its constitution. Con-
sequently, the country’s international image changed, with Qatar regarded as an 
active player rather than a conciliating mediator.4 Qatar participated in military 
action in April 2011 under the NATO-led international coalition against Colonel 
Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya, and as part of the Arab League, Qatar also 
called for Arab troops to be sent to Syria to stop the bloodshed there.
A regional power vacuum during 2011–13 prompted a shift in Qatar’s foreign 
policy and pushed the country to assume a leadership position, especially within 
the Arab League. Traditional powers in the Arab world were suffering a decline 
in power for various reasons. Riyadh was focused on its internal affairs because 
nascent rebellious movements had emerged within its borders, particularly in its 
eastern regions. Cairo was struggling in the transitional period that followed the 
January 2011 Egyptian revolution. Iraq was still reeling from the 2003 American 
invasion, while Syria was grappling with the popular revolt that broke out in March 
2011 and has continued since.
The Arab Spring revolutions and Qatar’s consistent position, as well as the posi-
tions of international and regional powers, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), provided an opportunity to begin a new phase in Qatari foreign policy, 
4  Jamal Abdullah, ‘The Foreign Policy of the State of Qatar (1995–2014): Transformations and Hori-
zons’, Al Diplomat, 10 (2014), pp. 24–8.
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one aligned with the vision of Doha’s political leadership at the time.5 There was 
a clear difference between Qatar’s position towards the Arab Spring revolutions 
and that of various GCC countries at both the political and diplomatic levels. This 
is embodied in official statements, as well as in actions including humanitarian, 
logistical and financial support and economic investment. 
Qatar’s regional strategic framework sought a balance between regional powers, 
and Doha was therefore placed in a very sensitive position vis-à-vis its support for 
the rising powers in countries undergoing socio-political change, some of which 
were proponents of political Islam. Doha had to be cautious not to provoke Iran, 
on the one hand, or other Gulf states which classified the Muslim Brotherhood as 
a banned terrorist organisation. Qatar’s policy of ‘impact and influence’ seems to 
have been successful for the country, thanks to the changing political climate and 
divided geopolitical structures across the region due to the Arab Spring revolutions. 
This substantial shift in Qatar’s foreign policy appears to reflect its confidence both 
in independent decision-making and in its ability to perform on a par with other 
countries in the region.
The Transition to Smart Power
Just days after Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani assumed power, the Egyp-
tian military overthrew the first elected civilian president in Egypt’s history, on 3 
July 2013. Some countries in the Arab region explicitly welcomed the coup, while 
most Western powers overlooked it. At the regional level, Turkey expressed its 
rejection of the sudden breakdown of Egypt’s democratic process. Qatar called for 
reconciliation between the various disputing groups in Egypt, but the new Egyp-
tian leadership was betting on suppressing protesting voices and on the exclusion 
of the Muslim Brotherhood movement from the political scene. These develop-
ments forced the Qatari leadership to adapt and reshape its policies.
Qatar’s diplomatic moves were somewhat quiet when compared with its previous 
stance, which can be attributed to the new leader’s desire to shape his country’s 
foreign policy strategically in line with Joseph Nye’s determinants of ‘smart pow-
er’,6 combining both soft and hard power approaches, while maintaining the 
constitutional principles underpinning Qatar’s foreign policy. The relatively 
quiet diplomacy of Qatar may be regarded not as a retreat, but rather as a foreign 
policy shift to bolster soft diplomacy tools such as the media and to bolster the 
5  Jamal Abdullah and Nabil al-Nasiri, Qatari Foreign Policy: Carryover or Redirection? (Doha: Al Jazeera 
Center for Studies, 2014). Available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documen
ts/2014/7/10/2014710114831205734Qatari%20Foreign%20Policy%20Carryover%20or%20Redirec-
tion.pdf (accessed 5 July 2015).
6  As characterised by Joseph Nye, ‘Smart power is the combination of hard and soft power to create 
optimal strategies in particular contexts’ (Quentin Cantu, ‘Interview: Dr. Joseph Nye, Jr.’, Diplomatic 
Courier: A Global Affairs Magazine, I 21 January 2012). See also Yahya Yahyaoui, ‘Obama and the 
Thesis of Smart Power’ (Arabic), 18 November 2013. Available from http://www.aljazeera.net/knowl-
edgegate/opinions/ةيكذلا-ةوقلا-ةحورطأو-امابوأ (accessed 5 July 2015).
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economy through increased investment at home and abroad. Furthermore, it aims 
to enhance education through promoting intellectual advancement and interna-
tional events in various fields of culture, arts and sports. 
Qatar’s decision-makers have adopted an open-door policy for dialogue with all 
parties wherever feasible. Because this stance contradicts that of some neighbour-
ing countries that chose to confront some political Islam movements, it has fuelled 
disagreements within the GCC, and led Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha on 5 March 2014.7 Qatar 
is seen as a major diplomatic supporter of the banned Muslim Brotherhood in 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and is unwilling to end its alleged support for Islamist 
and extremist groups in the region. Qatar and the GCC also remain divided over 
Egypt’s aborted democracy, and Qatar stands alienated, having been accused of 
breaching a GCC concord that was first signed in November 2014. The agreement 
guaranteed that member states would not interfere in each other’s internal affairs. 
Undoubtedly, this constituted the biggest challenge that Sheikh Tamim faced 
during the first year of his reign. It was an unprecedented crisis in the history 
of relations between members of the GCC and highlighted deep disagreements 
between Gulf capitals regarding regional issues.
Redirecting Foreign Policy
Countries in the region have adopted different approaches towards the tide of 
political Islam that has gained popularity in a number of countries affected by the 
Arab Spring.8 While the Muslim Brotherhood is a banned terrorist organisation in 
countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Qatar considers this group as one of 
the formative forces on the political map of the Arab world and argues for commu-
nication with the group and its inclusion in the political arena, particularly since 
the Brotherhood is also a significant factor in the polity of a number of other Gulf 
Arab states, including Kuwait and Bahrain.
Developments in the region following the expansion of IS to the north in both 
Syria and Iraq, as well as the Yemeni government falling to the Houthis, have led 
the Gulf countries to review their interrelationships. The countries sought to put 
an end to their disagreements in order to unite against security threats at both 
the national and regional levels. Hence, Riyadh’s mediation to resolve the Gulf 
crisis between Qatar and the UAE, Bahrain and itself reflects Saudi decision-mak-
ers’ awareness of the seriousness of the regional crisis and their responsibility as 
one of the central countries of the region. Qatar was among the first countries to 
7  Jamal Abdullah, ‘Motives and Consequences of Ambassador Withdrawals from Doha’, Al 
Jazeera Center for Studies, 24 March 2014. Available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/repo
rts/2014/04/201441061248251708.htm (accessed 1 July 2015).
8  Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications, 24 
September 2014. Available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/09/24/qatar-and-arab-spring-pol-
icy-drivers-and-regional-implications (accessed 1 July 2015).
Qatari Foreign Policy: Reorientation or Adjustment to the Rhythm? 25 
announce its participation in the Saudi-led military coalition to stop the expansion 
of the Houthis. Oman, however, did not participate in ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ 
(see later section on this operation).
Qatar has expressed flexibility and willingness to overcome the crisis with its neigh-
bours in the GCC. The emir’s speeches in Germany9 and at the United Nations 
during September 2014,10 as well as in his television interview on American news 
channel CNN,11 are public indications of this stance and present a combination of 
the old and the new features of Qatar’s foreign policy. In other words, this suggests 
that the country’s foreign policy has been adjusted without compromising the essence 
of the fundamental principles laid out in Qatar’s permanent constitution, with an 
emphasis on independent decision-making. For instance, in his first interview as 
the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim highlighted that Qatar is also a vocal supporter 
of Hamas, the Palestinian organisation which controls Gaza, and which the United 
States consider a terrorist organisation. When asked whether Qatar would continue 
its support of Hamas, Sheikh Tamim responded that ‘We support all Palestinian 
people. We believe Hamas is a very important part of the Palestinian people.’12
The principle of mediation, which was incorporated into Qatar’s foreign policy 
during the first decade of the millennium, remains one of its most important 
features. Sheikh Tamim has made a call in recent international forums for the pro-
motion of a culture of dialogue and ‘preventative diplomacy’ through pre-emptive 
peaceful methods rather than pre-emptive war, as well as for support for gov-
ernments to implement gradual reforms. All the signs suggest that Doha wishes 
to explore more flexible foreign policy approaches than those adopted after the 
outbreak of the Arab Spring revolutions in late 2010 without changing the funda-
mentals of its foreign policy.
Qatar’s Vision for the Region
In all his public speaking engagements in the US, Emir Tamim laid the founda-
tion for a solid partnership with the US and demonstrated the extent to which the 
state of Qatar can play a critical and a positive role in calming the region and in 
contributing to peace and stability in the Arab world at large. Qatar shares with the 
US a vision of stability and peace; however, Qatar is advocating a different tactic 
for dealing with these challenges.13 
9  Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani, public speech, Germany, 17 September 2014. Available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6eYQJQYsxM (accessed 1 July 2015).
10  Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, public speech, UN General Assembly, 24 September 2014. 
Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3bZRLLLwMsc (accessed 8 July 2015).
11  Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour, 25 September 
2014. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vR9ezioJ4kQ (accessed 8 July 2015).
12  Mick Krever, ‘Qatar’s Emir: We Don’t Fund Terrorists’, CNN, 25 September 2014. Available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/25/world/meast/qatar-emir (accessed 12 July 2015).
13  Tamim H. Al-Thani, ‘Qatar’s Message to Obama’, New York Times, 23 February 2015. Available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/opinion/qatars-message-to-obama.html?_r=0 (accessed 5 July 
2015).
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The tenets of Article 7 of its constitution allow Qatar a wide margin for manoeuvre 
and give it the credibility needed to act as an independent but concerned member 
of the international community. Qatar’s transformative foreign policy is similar to 
that of Norway. For instance, Norway maintains open relations with Hamas and 
keeps funding many humanitarian projects in the Gaza Strip unabated despite 
the criticism it receives from the US or Israel. In addition, Norway was the first 
country to send its envoys to the Gaza Strip in support of the newly formed unity 
government in 2007. Norway did so against the will of the US and without fully 
coordinating its steps with the EU.14 Both Norway and Qatar garner their cred-
ibility to initiate such moves from their interest in separating the humanitarian 
from the political; thus the two countries maintain open relations with many of the 
parties concerned and allow both sides to present their cases equally. The open 
channels that Norway and Qatar keep with many actors around the world serve 
as crucial media for communication and assist in bridging the gaps between and 
among all the parties concerned in any conflict zone. 
The Qatari vision for a more stable Middle East was made public in an opinion 
piece in the New York Times,15 in which the Qatari leadership emphasised the fol-
lowing principles: justice, security, equality and restoring hope for all. The Emir’s 
vision promised a better option than the one-solution-fits-all approach that the 
US has been championing for the last few decades in a region so diverse and long-
ing for dialogue and understanding. The Qatari message of justice and peace for 
all offers the US a different path and proposes an alternative to all the old and 
unsuccessful policies of the US in the region. Qatar’s emphasis on solving the Pal-
estinian–Israeli conflict is sound advice and should be given serious consideration 
by the Obama Administration. According to many observers in the region, this 
conflict serves as the biggest recruiter for IS.16 The Qatari leadership shares that 
view, and argues that the conflict is conducive to many of the acts of violence that 
take place in the region and beyond.
14  Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Norway Normalizes Relations with the Palestinian Unity 
Government’, Electronic Intifada, 17 March 2007.
15  Al-Thani, ‘Qatar’s Message to Obama’.
16  ‘King of Jordan: ISIS Used Gaza Conflict as Recruiting Tool’, CBS News, 25 September 2014. 
Available at http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/king-of-jordan-isis-used-gaza-conflict-as-recruiting-tool 
(accessed 5 July 2015).
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Qatar’s Attitudes to Operation Decisive Storm
Qatar was among the first countries to announce its participation in the Saudi-led 
military coalition in Yemen to stop the expansion of the Houthis, who seemed to be a 
stone’s throw away from Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, one of the most import-
ant waterways in the world.
Doha’s stance stems from the principle that Arabs should take the lead in solving prob-
lems and dilemmas they face, and that those with capacity should unite to cooperate 
with each other.17
The approach adopted by Qatar has translated on the ground in Yemen as the adop-
tion of all possible options in order to establish peace and security in the region. This 
includes dialogue, diplomatic solutions and finally military action, as required by the 
situation on the ground.
In his address to Arab leaders during the 26th Arab Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh on 28 
March 2015, the emir of Qatar said:
The recent events which were perpetrated by Ansar Allah group in collabora-
tion with the former president are an assault on the peaceful transition process 
in Yemen. They vacated the results of the national dialogue of its content, con-
fiscated the political legitimacy and broke down the State institutions, and the 
most dangerous of all, they sow the seeds of a newly introduced hateful phe-
nomenon in Yemen – political sectarianism. Therefore, the Ansar Allah militia 
movement and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh are responsible for the 
recent escalation, which led to the launch of the Operation Decisive Storm.18
Based on this, Sheikh Tamim called on all parties and political forces to prioritise 
Yemen’s interests and its people, and respect the legitimacy of President Hadi and his 
globally recognised government by withdrawing militias from the state institutions and 
public places, and working to complete the implementation of the political process. 
He also called all involved to stand by the legitimate government in Yemen and reject 
the situation created by Houthi-led militias, in order to maintain the unity, security 
and stability of Yemen. 
17  Al-Thani, ‘Qatar’s Message to Obama’.
18  ‘Text of the Speech of the Emir of Qatar during the Arab Summit in Sharm el-Sheikh’, Shabakat 
Al-ialam Al-Arabiya, Moheet. Available at http://moheet.com/يبرعلا-ةمقلا-مامأ-رطق-ريمأ-ةملك-صن-رشنن.
html#.VSZK5r7fqUk (accessed 9 April 2015).
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Conclusion
In recent years, the Arab Spring and its repercussions have catalysed the transition 
of Qatar’s diplomacy from that of mediation to that of influence. There is no doubt 
that the independence of the country’s foreign policy is underlined by its autonomous 
income sources (derived from the production and export of oil and gas as well as exter-
nal investments), which confer competitive advantages as a regional power.
Qatar’s emergence as a rising regional power since the early 2000s has occured bea-
cause of its significant economic base and the leadership vacuum left by major regional 
powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq. An added factor was the United States’ 
reluctance to interfere in regional conflicts after disastrous experiences in both Afghan-
istan and Iraq.
Qatar’s transformation into an influential regional and international power after the 
Arab Spring revolutions was a turning point in Doha’s foreign policy approach, taking 
advantage of the multi-dimensional soft power tools that had been developed and 
strengthened during the previous decade and beyond. This change demonstrated that 
Doha’s foreign policy is flexible and uses multiple strategic options based on the inde-
pendence of its decision-making.
Accordingly, the recent readjustment of the country’s foreign policy is consistent 
with developments affecting the region: in the interests of the state, it is necessary to 
redirect its external policies to serve its national interests without compromising its 
principles. This is evident from Qatar’s return to the mediator role and the use of soft 
power tools, with a continued commitment to international alliances aimed at stopping 
any threat to its national security or the security of the region.
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Within the context of expanding South–South cooperation on trade and aid, this paper 
explores Qatar’s economic engagements with Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), both through 
state-sponsored charity and business enterprises, over the last half decade. We gather 
insight for understanding the Qatari strategy towards SSA by reviewing the state’s 
objectives as they are laid out in the Qatar National Vision 2030 as well as by drawing 
on Qatar’s use of ‘subtle power’ in its foreign policy. More specifically, we problema-
tise Qatar’s engagement with SSA by comparing Qatari charitable programmes in the 
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Introduction
Africa being the target for foreign direct investment (FDI) by the ‘BRIC [Brazil, Russia, 
India and China] plus group’, which constitutes the ‘New Global Middle’,2 the con-
tinent received a total of US$57 billion in investment inflows in 2013, primarily in 
commodities and infrastructure.3 South–South trade has been robust, although there 
is some concern that Africa’s exports to the South mirror the continent’s exports to 
developed countries. Africa’s exports to non-African developing states are calculated 
to be 90 per cent in primary products; 67 per cent of these consisting of fuels – oil, gas 
and coal; comparably, 92 per cent of exports to the United States and 75 per cent to 
the European Union are also primary products.4 Most of the South–South investment 
originates from the BRIC states; however, the emerging Gulf Cooperation Council 
states (GCC) have also increased their investment and trade relations with the conti-
nent.5 Most of this capital flow has been targeted within the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, reaching North African states, while only a handful of states in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have been targeted.6 
The GCC states have a history of trade and cultural exchange with Africa, facilitated by 
their geographic proximity, although trade relations waned in recent decades. How-
ever, since 2002, trade between Africa and the wider Middle East, much of it with the 
GCC states, has risen by 400 per cent to almost US$50 billion.7 Other figures analysing 
the period between 2000 and 2009 suggest that annual trade between the GCC states 
and African countries has risen by 270 per cent to more than US$18 billion.8 Africa, 
especially SSA, has experienced a decade of growth consistently surpassing 5 per cent as 
FDI has put financing into roads, railways, information and communications technol-
ogy, water and power. Despite the growth, there remains a significant deficit of US$93 
billion annually to meet the continent’s infrastructure needs up to the end of 2020.9 
This continent-wide growth is an attractive opportunity for states that want to capitalise 
on new market opportunities. A mapping of Qatar’s engagements with SSA reveals a 
noteworthy pattern that may offer insight into Qatari foreign policy and strategies for 
economic diversification. 
2  Timothy Shaw, Andrew Cooper and Gregory Chin, ‘Emerging Powers and Africa: Implications for/
from Global Governance?’, Politikon 36/1 (2009), pp. 27–44. Available at http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/abs/10.1080/02589340903155385 (accessed 16 September 2015).
3  UNCTAD, Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan, World Investment Report 2014 (New York and 
Geneva, 2014).
4  Maxi Schoeman, ‘Of BRICs and Mortar: The Growing Relations between Africa and the Global 
South’, International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 46/1 (2011), pp. 33–51 at pp. 38–9.
5  Gulf Cooperation Council states are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates.
6  Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk and Reward: The Gulf ’s Push into African Infrastructure (London, 
2014).
7  Mirna Sleiman, ‘Wealthy Gulf Investors Warm to Africa’, Reuters, 2 January 2013. Available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/02/us-gulf-africa-investment-idUSBRE9010B520130102 
(accessed 16 September 2015).
8  Michael Peel, ‘Africa and the Gulf’, Survival 55/ 4 (2013), pp. 143–54 at p. 146. Available at http://
www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2013.823037 (accessed 14 November 2014).
9  Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk and Reward, p. 3.
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This paper explores Qatari economic engagements with SSA, both through its 
state-sponsored charity and its business enterprises, over the past half decade. Within 
a context of increased South–South cooperation, specifically between emerging econ-
omies and African states, Qatar is not as heavily invested in SSA as other emerging 
economies, as exemplified by the small number of business ventures launched by 
Qatari state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This analysis presents a cursory comparison of 
Qatar’s South–South engagements with SSA and East Asia for the purpose of demon-
strating the lopsided expansion of trade relations and interdependencies within the 
hydrocarbon sector, where Qatar has a comparative advantage. On the other hand, 
there has been an expansion of Qatari-sponsored aid programmes focused on educa-
tion and social development in SSA. This approach to SSA may indicate that Qatar is 
promoting development that may provide benefits in the future. 
It is difficult to argue that a nation-state would utilise foreign aid donations purely 
from charitable motives. Foreign aid is considered a political tool with which states can 
promote their own interests abroad or bolster their international image. Foreign aid 
from GCC states was generally thought to increase during periods of high oil prices 
and decrease when prices dropped. Young recently contradicted this notion, showing 
that the current trends of interventionist GCC states, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia and 
the United Arab Emirates, is for continued foreign aid in the MENA region despite 
historically low oil prices that put pressure on state budgets. These Gulf states are 
supporting strategic partners abroad during a period of constricting markets and high 
domestic demand. Young writes that ‘[T]he politics of Gulf Arab state aid is, above all, 
strategic. Political goals can override economic prudence.’10 Agreeing with this prem-
ise leads to questions as to Qatar’s intentions towards SSA. 
We gather insight for understanding the Qatari strategy towards SSA by reviewing 
the state’s objectives as they are laid out in the Qatar National Vision 2030, as well as 
by drawing on Qatar’s use of ‘subtle power’ in its foreign policy. More specifically, 
we problematise Qatar’s engagement with SSA by comparing Qatari charitable pro-
grammes in the region with the state’s economic interests; we then compare the SSA 
economic interests with recent engagements with Asian nations to demonstrate the 
variance. Considering the proximity of the Arab Gulf to SSA, by way of the Horn of 
Africa, we assume that Qatar could capitalise on the recent oil and gas discoveries 
in East Africa as an opportunity for expanding its hydrocarbon extraction industry 
into the nascent African market. The question that arises is: despite its comparative 
advantage in hydrocarbon extraction and the opportunities presented by these recent 
discoveries, why is Qatar seemingly more engaged in charitable enterprises than 
extractive industries in SSA? Qatar, in relation to its capacity for investment and trade, 
has engaged SSA much less than other enterprising GCC states, according to an Econ-
omist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report.11 
10  Karen E. Young, ‘The Limits of Gulf Arab Aid: Energy Markets and Foreign Policy’, EUCERS 
‘Reflections’ Working Paper Series 1 (Summer 2015), pp. 43–53 at p. 43. Available at http://www.kcl.
ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/research/groups/eucers/reflections-1-2015.pdf (accessed 16 Sep-
tember 2015).
11  Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk and Reward.
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Qatar’s National Vision 2030: A Policy Statement
The Qatar National Vision 2030 presents the state’s goals for economic, human, social 
and environmental development as it progresses towards developed state status by 
2030.12 Three elements of this plan have an impact on the current analysis: first, the 
pursuit of a diversified economy away from dependence on hydrocarbon exports; 
second, a commitment to improving access to higher education so that Qatari citizens 
are prepared to compete in the global knowledge economy; third, the state’s commit-
ment to being a leader in regional and global development. It is of note that all GCC 
states have developed their own versions of a national vision looking beyond 2020, 
and that similarities exist between these; one instance is the common objective of eco-
nomic diversification away from hydrocarbon dependency. In this respect, Qatar is an 
outlier because its national vision situates economic diversification as a supplement 
to its existing natural gas sector, while the other GCC states’ national visions plan for 
diversification in terms of a post-hydrocarbon economy.13 Qatar Petroleum (QP), a 
state-owned corporation, is the world leader in liquid natural gas (LNG) exports. An 
intangible added value of these assets is the global demand for LNG, which allows 
Qatar to create interdependencies through trade with other emerging states. 
Qatar’s known oil reserves are sufficient to continue current output levels for another 
23 years, and its natural gas reserves constitute 5 per cent of the global total and are the 
third largest in the world.14 QP and its subsidiaries undertake all aspects of upstream 
and downstream energy development, including transport and trade. In pursuit of 
economic development and a ‘competitive and diversified economy’,15 opportunities 
present themselves in the natural resource extractive industries located in SSA, specif-
ically the recent discoveries of oil and gas deposits in East Africa. Here Qatar could 
exploit its comparative advantage in the hydrocarbon extraction industry, including 
refining and exporting. Investment and development of industry in SSA also support 
Qatar’s vision to ‘play a significant role in the global partnership for development’.16 
These are two reasons for Qatar to venture into the African extractives industry. 
A brief overview of Qatar’s GDP illustrates the state’s comparative advantage in hydro-
carbon extraction, given the dominance of the oil and gas sector at 58 per cent of 
national output.17 A combination of services makes up the second largest output: 
12  General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar National Vision 2030 (Doha, 2008). Available 
at http://www.gsdp.gov.qa/portal/page/portal/gsdp_en/qatar_national_vision/qnv_2030_document/
QNV2030_English_v2.pdf (accessed 10 July 2014).
13  Martin Hvidt, Economic Diversification in the GCC Countries: Past Record and Future Trends, Kuwait 
Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, Research Paper No. 
27. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/research/papers/economicdiversifica-
tion.aspx (accessed 16 September 2015).
14  Claude Berrebi, Francisco Martorell and Jeffery C. Tanner, ‘Qatar’s Labor Markets at a Crucial 
Crossroad’, Middle East Journal, 63/3 (2009), pp. 421–42 at p. 423.
15  General Secretariat for Development Planning, Qatar National Vision 2030, p. 11.
16  Ibid.
17  World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat: Qatar, 18 March 2014, p. 
48. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s296_e.pdf (accessed 16 September 2015).
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finance, insurance and real estate (10.2 per cent), followed by manufacturing (9.8 per 
cent) to round out the top three.18 The World Trade Organization identifies the most 
effective element of diversification as the downstream energy industries, due to their 
synergies with the primary exports of oil and gas. Growth within the non-hydrocarbon 
GDP19 is supported by expansion in the banking industries, such as Qatar National 
Bank’s buy-in of Togo’s Ecobank Transnational, Egypt’s Qatar National Bank Alahly 
and South Africa’s Public Investment Corp.20  
Qatar thus far has more service assets than extractive industries located in SSA, even 
though there is the opportunity for expanding the extractive sector into East Africa. 
This begins to look like a deliberate strategy as we go on to compare Qatar’s trade 
relations with Asian countries and with Africa. 
Qatari–South Trade Patterns
An EIU report from 2011 that surveyed emerging market trade and investment stated 
that Asia is expected to be the most important emerging-market region for the GCC 
states due to the demand for oil.21 Certainly, Qatar is investing for the purpose of 
increasing the nation’s wealth, but economics is only part of the strategy. Qatar’s for-
eign policy has been to manoeuvre between competitors and make itself useful to 
powerful states as well as sub-state political actors. The same EIU report claims that 
the GCC states’ trade with Africa has been increasing,22 except for Qatar.
Trade between Qatar and Africa has been minuscule in recent years. Tables 1 and 
2 show that Qatari exports to Africa and imports from the continent between 2010 
and 2012 have made up less than 2 per cent of national trade in both directions. In 
2010 Qatar passed legislation to adopt the Protocol on the Preferential Tariff Scheme 
for the Trade Preferential System among members of the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation,23 which includes more than 20 countries from SSA as members.24 This 
arrangement offers reciprocal preferential tariff access among trade partners. Qatar 
has 22 bilateral investment agreements (some of which have not been ratified); four of 
these partner with African states, two of them from SSA. They include Egypt, Morocco, 
Senegal and Sudan.25 Even with arrangements meant to facilitate trade between Qatar 
18  Ibid.
19  Non-hydrocarbon GDP is defined as all economic activity other than upstream oil and gas production.
20  R. Tuttle, ‘Qatar National Bank Expands in Africa with Ecobank Deal’, Bloomberg Business, 4 
September 2014. Available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-04/qatar-national-
bank-expands-in-africa-with-ecobank-deal (accessed 16 September 2015).
21  Economist Intelligence Unit, GCC Trade and Investment Flows: The Emerging-Market Surge (London, 
2011). Available at http://www.economistinsights.com/sites/default/files/GCC%20Trade%20and%20
investment%20flows.pdf (accessed 16 September 2015).
22  Ibid., pp. 17–25.
23  World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, p. 24.
24  OIC, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation: Member States (n.d.). Available at http://www.oic-oci.org/
oicv2/states (accessed 2 December 2014).
25  World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, p. 26.
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and these selected African states, little has been done in actuality. As Tables 1 and 
2 illustrate, there is a vast difference between Qatar’s trade with the African and the 
Asian regions.26 
Table 1. Qatar’s Merchandise Exports by Destination, including re-exports (for selected 
regions and states)
Region/State % of total in 2010 % of total in 2011 % of total in 2012
Africa 1.1 1.3 1.3
South Africa 0.3 0.7 0.8
Asia 73.5 73.6 78.1
China 3.0 3.9 5.1
Japan 28.7 26.1 27.7
Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, pp. 80 and 82.
Table 2. Qatar’s Merchandise Imports by Origin, 2010–12 (for selected regions and states)
Region/State % of total in 2010 % of total in 2011 % of total in 2012
Africa 1.8 1.7 1.6
Egypt 1.2 1.2 1.2
Asia 30.5 30.0 33.9
China 9.1 9.6 9.8
Japan 7.5 5.6 8.2
Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review, pp. 80 and 82.
26  The list of Asian countries that trade with Qatar is incomplete in Tables 1 and 2. China and Japan 
make up the largest percentages and therefore are contrasted with Africa’s only and largest contributors.
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Trade and Investment in Asia
In contrast to the limited economic relations shown in Tables 1 and 2 between Qatar 
and SSA, trade relationships with partner states in Asia and the Pacific are expanding. 
Bilateral trade between Qatar and Thailand increased by 43 per cent to US$4 billion 
in 2013, from US$2.8 billion in 2012.27 Qatar trades oil and LNG, fertiliser and pesti-
cide, and finished oils and chemicals with Thailand in exchange for motor cars, parts 
and accessories, precious stones and jewellery, iron and steel machinery and jasmine 
rice, to name a few products. The connection with the Philippines is another that is 
growing stronger. In the ten months ending in October 2013, bilateral trade between 
Qatar and the Philippines reached US$862 million.28 Through this deal, Qatar 
receives meat products, bananas, cereals and condiments, and exports petroleum oils 
and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, polymers of ethylene, polyethylene, liq-
uefied butane and propane and other liquefied petroleum gases, among others, as 
well as unwrought aluminium alloys, tower cranes, scaffolding and other construction 
equipment. In 2008–2009 QP and the China National Offshore Oil Company signed 
multiple agreements; one, a 25-year Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement, 
makes Qatar the leading supplier of LNG to China.29 QP also has a stake in a US$4 
billion petrochemical complex in Vietnam.30 More recently, the Qatar Investment 
Authority (QIA) has earmarked US$15–20 billion for investments in Asian healthcare, 
infrastructure and real estate.31 This investment and trade strategy with Asia is much 
broader than the current arrangements in SSA. 
Investment in Africa
Recently discovered oil and gas deposits in the East African states of Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Mozambique may revitalise the region as production 
is expected to begin between 2017 and 2019.32 This opportunity did not receive much 
attention from Qatar. Qatar Petroleum International (QPI) is a partner in only two 
27  Joey Aguilar, ‘Diplomat: Thailand in Talks to Invite Qatari Investment’, Gulf Times, 28 January 
2014. Available at http://www.gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/379338/diplomat:-thailand-in-talks-
to-invite-qatari-investment (accessed 16 September 2015).
28  Peter Alagos, ‘Qatar–Philippines 10-Month Trade Volume Reaches USD862m in 2013’, ZAWYA, 
19 February 2014. Available at http://www.zawya.com/story/QatarPhilippines_10month_trade_
volume_reaches_USD862m_in_2013-ZAWYA20140219034434 (accessed 28 May 2014).
29  Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power, Occasional Paper 
No. 6, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign 
Service in Qatar.
30  Mohd Fauzi Bin Abu-Hussin, ‘Gulf Arab Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): ASEAN Targets of 
Opportunity’, Middle East Institute, 20 March 2013. Available at http://www.mei.edu/content/gulf-ar-
ab-foreign-direct-investment-fdi-asean-targets-opportunity (accessed 9 January 2014).
31  Brian Spegele, ‘Qatar’s Sovereign-Wealth Fund to Invest at Least $15 Billion in Asia’, Wall Street 
Journal, 4 November 2014. Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/qatars-sovereign-wealth-fund-to-
invest-at-least-15-billion-in-asia-1415080679 (accessed 16 September 2015).
32  D. A. Barber, ‘Geopolitics: Challenges of East Africa’s Oil and Gas Boom, Part 1’, AFK Insider, 
27 August 2014. Available at http://afkinsider.com/70140/challenges-east-africas-oil-gas-boom-part-1 
(accessed 15 September 2014).
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East African sites. In Mauritania, QPI is partnered with Total E&P Mauritania and 
Sonatrach. QPI has a 20 per cent working interest as an active non-operating partner 
in the two exploration blocks; Total E&P Mauritania has 60 per cent as operator and 
Sonatrac 20 per cent. Seismic and other necessary studies have been completed and 
two exploration wells have been drilled. QPI also has a share subscription to 15 per 
cent of Total E&P Congo relating to nine producing assets and three exploration 
licences in the country.33 
In mid-2014, Qatar Mining (QM) was awarded four mining permits in the state of Mali 
in West Africa, creating QM Mali Greenfield,34 the SOE’s first project in Africa. It was 
thought to be an initial step towards securing a supply of raw materials for Qatari-based 
industries and to focus investment on commodities where local and global demand are 
high. QM was established in 2010 to undertake targeted, value-accretive investments in 
the mining and metals sector and to become an international multi-commodity mining 
company by 2024. However, in June 2015, The website oilprice.com reported that the 
QIA was abandoning the mining sector due to poorly performing markets in precious 
and non-precious metals, compounded by poor earnings from oil and natural gas.35 
In light of the comparison of investment and trade in the hydrocarbon sector between 
Qatar and SSA on the one hand and Asia on the other, it is obvious that the focus for 
hydrocarbons is in Asia. In Africa, Qatar is investing primarily in banking and insur-
ance, with a few large-scale real estate projects, all located in North Africa except for 
one, which is located in Sudan. This regional comparison begins to look like a delib-
erate strategy as the state concentrates the expansion of different sectors into separate 
regions. This design in turn begins to resemble established characteristics of Qatar’s 
foreign policy, in which the state has demonstrated significant agency manoeuvring 
between rival political actors, both state and non-state, while maintaining relations 
with both sides even when criticised for doing so. In the same way, we argue, Qatar 
is executing separate economic strategies in different regions. This idea is further 
illustrated by the depth of foreign aid directed towards SSA. Before presenting that 
evidence, however, it is necessary to explore further Qatar’s variety of power. 
33  ‘Qatar Petroleum International: Nasser Khalil Al-Jaidah, CEO’, Energy Boardroom, 2 September 
2014. Available at http://www.energyboardroom.com/interviews/qatar-petroleum-international-qpi-
nasser-khalil-al-jaidah-ceo (accessed 16 September 2015).
34  3SMedia, ‘Qatar’s Foray into West African Mineral Resources’, miningne.ws, 21 July 2014. Available 
at http://www.miningne.ws/2014/07/21/qatars-foray-into-west-african-mineral-resources (accessed 16 
September 2015).
35  Michael McDonald, ‘Key Points for Investing in Global Mining Sector’, Oilprice.com, 21 June 2015. 
Available at http://oilprice.com/Metals/Commodities/Key-Points-For-Investing-In-Global-Mining-
Sector.html (accessed 16 September 2015).
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Qatar’s ‘Subtle Power’
It is possible to identify at least five motivations that guide Qatar’s foreign policy. First 
is the maintenance of the country’s own security and stability.36 Qatar is located in an 
area rife with political and military rivalries; by raising its international profile, it aims 
to prevent the perils of small-state anonymity and vulnerability.37 Second, in building 
its reputation as an effective mediator of conflict, Qatar not only contributes to its first 
aim of preventing the spill-over of regional violence, but seeks to expand its influence 
as an international player, vis-à-vis competing hegemons within the region.38 Third, 
Qatar, seeks to appeal to and leverage the international community, branding itself as 
a key international ally and a potential host state for global economics and business.39 
Fourth, the state’s foreign policy has been largely influenced by Qatari perspectives on 
sovereign wealth management,40 as well as the maximisation of its natural resources to 
achieve domestic development.41 Fifth, and most recently, observers have suggested 
that Qatar has begun to turn away from self-described ‘arrogant policies’ of absolute 
support for regional Islamist groups and revolutions, signalling a softening in foreign 
policy goals and a return to the brand of neutral mediator.42 Achieving these aims is 
made possible by the strategic utilisation of the state’s most effective capabilities: LNG 
exports and a vast amount of capital reserves. Qatar’s execution of its foreign policy is 
not one based on coercion, but rather a strategic utilisation of soft power attributes. 
Kamrava identifies four key components that Qatar utilises that he terms ‘subtle pow-
er’.43 Safety and security ‘guaranteed through physical and military protection’ is the 
first component. This does not necessarily involve ‘force projection and coercion or 
bribery’. Qatar has national security coverage because the United States’ command 
centre for air operations for the MENA region is located at Al Udaid Air base, just 
outside Doha.44 
36  Line Khatib, ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy: The Limits of Pragmatism’, International Affairs 89/2 (2013), pp. 
417–31 at p. 418. Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.ezproxy.lib.umb.edu/doi/10.1111/1468-
2346.12025/abstract (accessed 10 January 2014).
37  Ibid. Andrew Cooper and Thimothy Shaw, ‘The Diplomacies of Small States at the Start of the 
Twenty-First Century: How Vulnerable? How Resilient?’, in Andrew Cooper and Thimothy Shaw 
(eds), The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (New York, 2013), pp. 1–18.
38  Khatib, ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy’, p. 419.
39  Ibid., pp. 419–20.
40  Asa Fitch, ‘Qatar SWF Drops Flashy Deals as Foreign Policy Shift, Report Says’, Wall Street Journal, 
16 June 2014. Available at http http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2014/06/16/qatar-swf-drops-flashy-
deals-as-foreign-policy-shifts-report-says/ (accessed 16 September 2015).
41  ‘Envoy to US Spells Out Qatar’s Foreign Policy’, Gulf Times, 12 July 2014. Available at http://www.
gulf-times.com/qatar/178/details/400164/envoy-to-us-spells-out-qatar%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy 
(accessed 16 September 2015).
42  Sigurd Neubauer, ‘Qatar’s Changing Foreign Policy’, Sada, 8 April 2014. Available at http://car-
negieendowment.org/sada/2014/04/08/qatar-s-changing-foreign-policy/h7gf (accessed 16 September 
2015). ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy: Change of Tack’, Economist, 15 July 2013. Available at http://www.
economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2013/07/qatar-s-foreign-policy (accessed 16 September 2015).
43  Mehran Kamrava, Qatar: Small State, Big Politics (Ithaca, 2013), p. 61.
44  Thom Shanker, ‘Hagel Lifts Veil on Major Military Center in Qatar’, New York Times, 11 December 
2013. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/12/world/middleeast/hagel-lifts-veil-on-major-
military-center-in-qatar.html?_r=0 (accessed 16 September 2015).
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Prestige derived from brand recognition and the development of a positive inter-
national reputation is the second component of subtle power. Kamrava identifies a 
number of ways in which countries acquire such an image: as ‘a result of the behaviors 
of their leaders domestically and on the world stage, the reliability of the products they 
manufacture, their foreign policies, their responses to natural disasters or political 
crises, the scientific and cultural products they export, and the deliberate marketing 
and branding efforts they undertake’. Prestige of this sort ‘can enhance overall effec-
tiveness in agenda-setting and in influencing frameworks and preferences’.45 Qatar has 
been constructing its brand through the promotion of its high-profile Al Jazeera News 
Network, its ‘five-star’ Qatar Airlines, and major sports events including tennis, golf 
and auto racing tournaments and matches, as well as hosting such global events as the 
2022 World Cup tournament. 
A positive global image is reinforced by a ‘proactive presence on the global stage’. A 
global presence is maintained by private enterprises or SOEs combined with a diplo-
matic posture that promotes the state and its entities as ‘a global good citizen’. Qatar 
has presented itself as an impartial mediator in active disputes in the MENA region 
and East Africa.46  
The fourth component of subtle power is wealth. Considered a classic hard power asset, 
wealth produces influence by control and ownership over valuable economic assets 
– persistent and sizeable international investments.47 It has already been mentioned 
that Qatar has amassed large capital surpluses derived from hydrocarbon rents over 
the 2000-08 period. The state has pledged development aid in mediation situations 
as a means of encouraging a settlement. Additionally, a major mechanism for Qatari 
economic diversification and long-term wealth management of oil and gas surpluses 
is the QIA, which manages its sovereign wealth fund (SWF), which holds an estimated 
US$120 billion in assets and is comprised of five subsidiaries.48 Qatar intends to distin-
guish itself within the Gulf Cooperation Council as a ‘modern business-orientated state 
that is able to compete in the international economy’.49 
As Qatar pursues its diversification away from dependence on hydrocarbon exports, 
it is investing in financial services sectors across the globe and in Africa particu-
larly. Moreover, a strategy of expanding the hydrocarbon sector appears to be 
targeted towards Asian states in need of energy to fuel development. Returning 
to SSA, we see a broad expenditure of foreign aid directed where Qatar does not 
have much economic investment beyond the services mentioned. It is at this point 
that the observation presented by Young in the introduction becomes problematic. 
45  Kamrava, Qatar, pp. 61–2.
46  Mustafa el-Labbad, ‘Qatar: Big Ambitions, Limited Capabilities’, Perspectives: Analysis and Commen-
tary from the Middle East & North Africa 4, pp. 18–23. Khatib, ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy’. Ulrichsen, The 
GCC States and the Shifting Balance of Global Power.
47  Ibid., p. 64.
48  SWFI, Fund Rankings (n.d.). Available at http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings (accessed 10 
October 2014).
49  Khatib, ‘Qatar’s Foreign Policy’, p. 420.
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Why would Qatar provide foreign aid where its economic and security interests are min-
imal? Before presenting an answer to this question it is prudent to present the evidence. 
Impact Investing 
Impact investing can be broadly defined as an investment made with an intent to 
create social or environmental benefit in addition to financial return or private sector 
development.50 Research by the World Economic Forum suggests that impact investing 
can offer a number of benefits: the opportunity to create tremendous social change in 
targeted communities or states; the creative funding of projects which might otherwise 
go unfunded and the scaling of organisations with viable business models that meet 
pressing social or environmental challenges.51 The practice is also cited as emphasising 
long-term value creation, driving higher investor commitment as a result of their knowl-
edge about a state or organisation’s sustainable and socially responsible investment 
approach, and it offers the opportunity to carve out a distinct, competitive advantage 
for practitioners amongst their peers.52 Foundations are particularly noted as a natu-
ral fit for impact investing given their concerted focus on addressing key social sector 
challenges.53 Qatari foundations are duly engaged in this enterprise.
Qatar’s National Vision 2030 aligns itself quite closely with the principles of impact 
investing, in recognising that future sustainability involves more than economic pros-
perity, and must also address issues of social and human development. There is a 
strong, researched correlation between philanthropic action and a state’s or organ-
isation’s recognised ‘brand’. By doubling its presence in selected African countries, 
in which it is already present via the Education Above All (EAA) initiative,54 Qatar 
has increased its presence and consequently enhanced its soft power in Africa. Help-
ing support peace in Africa through education is a way to ‘brand’ itself not only as a 
leader in education but also as a strong contributor to peace and development across 
the continent. Moreover, the UNESCO Education for All (EFA) Global Monitoring 
Report 2011 recognises conflict as a major impediment to achievement of EFA goals, 
especially in SSA.55 
50  Dalberg Global Development Advisors, Impact Investing in West Africa (Washington, DC, 2011), p. 10.
51  Michael Drexler and Abigail Noble, From the Margins to the Mainstream: Assessment of the Impact 
Investment Sector and Opportunities to Engage Mainstream Investors (Cologny, 2013), pp. 9–10.
52  Ibid.
53  Ibid., p. 13.
54  The EAA foundation is a relatively new NGO, established in 2012 by Her Excellency Sheikha 
Moza bint Nasser, an active advocate of access to quality education in the international arena. Before 
launching the EAA she had set up several initiatives which now fall under its umbrella. In 2010, sup-
ported by His Highness the Father Emir and Sheikha Moza, Qatar introduced a resolution on ‘The 
Right to Education in Emergency Situations’ at the UN General Assembly. The resolution, which was 
unanimously adopted, affirms the human right to education and access to it during crisis and conflict, 
and urges states to support this right as an integral element of humanitarian assistance and response. 
Her Excellency Sheikha Moza holds a number of notable roles in the field of education internation-
ally, as the current Chair, Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development; 
Special Envoy for Basic and Higher Education, UNESCO; and a member of the Steering Committee 
of the UN Secretary-General’s Global Education First Initiative, amongst others.
55  UNESCO, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and Education, EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011 
(Paris, 2011).
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A premier Qatari strategy in its mediation efforts has been the use of ‘carrot diplo-
macy’, or the facilitation of peace through the promise of financial aid for post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts. Indeed, many of Qatar’s more prominent mediation processes 
exemplify this approach, which fundamentally links the state’s quest for soft power 
influence in the Middle East and Africa. In Sudan, for example, Qatar used its eco-
nomic model of state capitalism for political dividends throughout the peace process, 
both by emphasising its already sizeable investments and by pledging new infusions 
of financial resources, including US$500 million for reconstruction assistance.56 For 
Somalia, Qatar Charity (QC) has been one of the most active not-for-profit organ-
isations operating in the country, paralleling high-level mediation efforts with the 
launch of dedicated relief programmes during the country’s recent famine.57 During 
the recent conflict in Mali, the Qatari Red Crescent was at one point the only humani-
tarian organisation to be granted access to the vast Northern Mali region, a privileged 
position acquired since the 1980s, through the establishment and funding of a wide 
network of institutions, madrassas, schools and charities in Mali.58 
Qatar has strengthened its presence in Africa over the past few years through aid and 
charity work. Most recently, QC implemented a relief and rehabilitation project for the 
people affected by the floods that have swept through the Somalian province of Middle 
Shabelle. The project will benefit around 93,000 people.59 In December 2014, the RAF 
in partnership with Qatar Airways inaugurated Al-Amal School for primary education 
in Djibouti, in accordance with a quality partnership which aims at launching several 
community initiatives. The school was inaugurated in conjunction with the arrival of 
Qatar Airways’ first flight to Djibouti International Airport. Al-Amal School is being 
implemented by the RAF in cooperation with the Sanabil Al-Khair Association and 
provides the opportunity for Arabic-language education to thousands of students from 
Bekados province, on the outskirts of Djibouti’s capital.60 
56  Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Qatar’s Mediation Initiatives’, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre 
Policy Brief, February 2013, p. 2.
57  QC is a well-established NGO which acts not only as a donor but also as an implementing agent 
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Ethiopia, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Senegal and Togo. QC’s partners include private foundations such 
as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and Fundación Kanouté. See: https://www.qcharity.org/
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(accessed 16 September 2015).
58  Ségolène Allemandou, ‘Is Qatar Fuelling the Crisis in North Mali?’, France 24, 23 Janaury 2013. 
Available at http://www.france24.com/en/20130121-qatar-mali-france-ansar-dine-mnla-al-qaeda-sun-
ni-islam-doha (accessed 16 September 2015).
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Conclusion
Qatar is engaging SSA more substantially through aid programmes that promote 
education and social development, despite the burgeoning hydrocarbon extraction 
industry, which is the state’s comparative advantage. Qatari leadership is advancing 
a programme for economic diversification in two ways. It is expanding its trade into 
East Asia by utilising natural gas exports to strengthen interdependencies with Asian 
states that crave energy sources. In SSA, diversification is under way as service indus-
tries, banking and insurance are expanding. Neoliberal thinking would probably drive 
Qatar to take advantage of East Africa’s proximity and sizeable markets, leading the 
state to move in that direction. However, that is not what is happening. In an attempt 
to politicise Qatar’s foreign aid to SSA, we assume that the underlying strategy is to 
promote education and social development in the region while simultaneously expand-
ing the service sectors. Over time, the hope is for this aid to assist in development and 
to promote economic entrepreneurship that could eventually benefit Qatari service 
enterprises in the region. 
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